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Abstract 
This study empirically characterizes the interdependence in cyber attacks and examines the 
impact from the first international treaty against cybercrimes (Convention on Cybercrimes: 
Europe Treaty Series No. 185). With the data covering 62 countries over the period from year 
2003 to 2007, we find that, international cooperation in enforcement as measured by the 
indicator of joining the Convention on Cybercrimes, deterred cyber attacks originating from any 
particular country by 15.81% ~ 24.77% (in 95% confidence interval). Second, joining the 
Convention also affected the interdependence in cyber attacks from two angels. First, for any 
pair of country, closer status in joining or not joining the Convention was associated with less 
negative or more positive correlation. Second, joining the Convention or joining it earlier was 
associated with lower correlation between countries over time. We discuss the policy 
implications from our findings to public authorities, cyber insurance companies and 
organizational users.   
 
 
1. Introduction 
Information security issues are characterized with interdependence. First, millions of thousands 
of computers and network systems are connected to the Internet while few software vendors are 
dominant in IT markets. Thus, one kind of vulnerability or risk in any particular system can 
easily spread to the whole network via physical linkage or be found in other systems using the 
same software platform. Second, IT has enabled in-depth-and-breath cooperation across 
organizational or country boundaries. Hence the security of any particular user is not 
independent but dependent on the effort of other users in the same value chain (Kunreuther and 
Heal 2003; Varian 2004). Third, information and communication technology has facilitated 
information security violators to attack across national boundaries. While conventional criminals 
tend to be localized, cyber criminals can easily cross national boundaries and exploit 
jurisdictional limitations between countries (Kshetri 2006).  
The interdependent nature of information security has important implications for public 
policies and business strategies. Government can directly address information security through 
enforcement against attackers. In an empirical study about the impact of information security 
enforcement on cyber attacks, Png et. al (2008) find insignificant deterrent effect of domestic 
enforcement on cyber attacks. However, they find compelling evidence of a displacement effect: 
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U.S. enforcement substantially increases attacks originating from other countries. Understanding 
the nature of country-level interdependence can guide governments to identify its counterparts to 
collaborate with and to effectively reduce the volume of attacks. Organizations manage 
information security risk through elimination, mitigation absorbance and transference (Böhme 
and Kataria 2006). In a review of the evolution of cyber-insurance, Majuca et al. propose cyber-
insurance as a powerful strategy for firms to transfer the residual information security risk. 
However, given the rampantly growing market for malicious online activities (Symantec 2008), 
the cyber-insurance market is both underdeveloped and underutilized due to the interdependent 
risks (Böhme and Kataria 2006). As discussed by Anderson and Moore (2008), “Interdependence 
can make some cyber-risks unattractive to insurers – particularly those risks that are globally 
rather than locally correlated”. 
The importance of interdependence in information security has attracted academic 
interests. The existing analytical work focus on user’s incentives in network systems (Kunreuther 
and Heal 2003; Varian 2004) and the empirical work focus on modeling risk arrival process and 
estimation of correlations within and between firms via simulation and honeypot experiments 
(Böhme and Kataria 2006). To our best knowledge, no study has measured the interdependence 
of cyber attacks across real entity (i.e., country in our paper) boundaries, nor attributed the 
interdependence into entities’ relationships.  
Furthermore, the empirical evidence of interdependence in cyber attacks calls for 
international cooperation in enforcement (Png et al. 2008), whereas, in reality countries are not 
consistent on this point. The Council of Europe, along with the U.S., Canada and Japan signed 
the Convention on Cybercrimes, Europe Treaty Series No. 1851, the first International treaty for 
crimes performed through Internet and other computer networks,  on 23 November 2001. One of 
the main purposes of the convention is for “setting up a fast and effective regime of international 
co-operation”.2 By the end of 2007, 39 EU countries and 4 non-EU countries have signed the 
convention and 21 countries out of them have further ratified and enacted it. Note that, although 
the convention has ultimately been embraced by the United States after a long debate, it has not 
yet entered into force even in several major EU countries (e.g., Germany, the United Kingdom, 
Belgium, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Sweden, etc.) Anderson et al. (2008) have emphasized that the 
European Commission must put pressure on the remaining member states to more actively 
participate in the Convention. Hence, whether the convention is an effective instrument to deter 
cyber attacks and how it affects the interdependence between countries are subject to empirical 
investigation.  
 In this paper, we study the above issues using a sample of attacks originating from 62 
countries over the period between January 2003 and December 2007.  Our empirical strategy 
models cyber attacks through worldwide-systematic risk and country-specific risk. We further 
divide country-specific risk into country-independent risk and country-to-country interdependent 
risk. For any pair of countries, their interdependence in cyber attacks is measured by the 
correlation of the residuals that cannot be explained by worldwide systematic risk and country-
independent risk during the period of year t. While Interdependence Theory links country 
conflicts to countries’ relative status in democracy, economic growth, alliance, political change, 
and trade interdependence, etc. (Oneal and  Russett 1997), we explain the country-to-country 
interdependence in cyber attacks through countries’ relative status with aspects that may affect 
attackers’ economic incentives. Those aspects are captured from the dimensions of economy, 
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technology, industry, international cooperation in enforcement and criminal culture. In particular, 
we measure the international cooperation in enforcement against cybercrimes by two variables: 
one is the relative status quo in joining the Convention. The other is the common longitudinal 
status since both countries have joined the Convention.  
We find that, firstly, signing the Convention on Cybercrimes deterred attacks from any 
particular country by 15.81% ~ 24.77% (in 95% confidence interval). Second, joining the 
Convention also affected the interdependence in cyber attacks from two angels. First, for any 
pair of country, closer status in joining or not joining the Convention was associated with less 
negative or more positive correlation. Second, joining the Convention or joining it earlier was 
associated with lower correlation between countries over time. We discuss the policy 
implications from our findings to public authorities, cyber insurance companies and 
organizational users.   
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents our model and 
methodology. Section 3 introduces the data. Section 4 presents the empirical results. In the last 
section, we discuss the policy implications to public authorities, cyber insurance companies and 
organization users and the future research direction. 
 
2. Model and Methodology 
In our empirical analysis, we use a two-stage model to measure and characterize the cross-
country interdependence of cyber attacks. We model cyber attacks through worldwide-
systematic effects and country-specific effects. This is analogous to the Capital Asset Pricing 
Model (CAPM) (Sharpe 1964) in finance in which the return on any particular capital asset is 
determined by the expected return of the market, the sensitivity of the asset returns to market 
return and the idiosyncratic risk specific to the capital asset. The time series of cyber attacks 
volume for any particular country and risk-combined return for any particular capital asset share 
some common features: 
First, both entities are a sub-system in a large system consisting of correlated components, 
thus are influenced by any change in the whole environment. In the financial market, the market-
wide effects can be caused by economy growth or downturn, government policies or natural 
disasters. In cyber attacks, the worldwide effects can be caused by the disclosure and exploit of 
any vulnerability in a standard software platform or the evolution of knowledge base in attacker 
community. 
Second, both types of values depend on participants’ distribution of investment. In the 
financial market, investors choose the proportion of each capital asset in their portfolio to 
maximize the net return. In cyber attacks, strategic attackers choose the source of attacks to 
reduce the detection probability and increase the chance of success. Hence, the deviation of both 
types of values from the system-wide trend is the function of characteristics pertaining to specific 
entity (country or the capital asset). 
Since the cyber space is digitalized and the network systems of every country are closely 
linked with each other via the Internet, the transportation cost in cyber space is almost negligible, 
which increases the inherent interdependence between countries. Hence, we further divide 
country-specific effects into country-independent factors and country-to-country interdependent 
factors.  
Following Png et al. (2008), we consider the country-independent factors that affect 
attackers’ economic incentives (i.e., opportunity cost, expected risk, and potential benefit). Png 
et al. (2008) include domestic enforcement events and U.S. enforcement events to measure the 
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attackers’ expected risk. However, they cannot find significant deterrent effect from domestic 
enforcement but compelling displacement effect from U.S. enforcement. Their finding suggests 
that international cooperation in enforcement is essential to deter cyber criminals. Therefore, in 
this study, rather than including domestic enforcement events, we measure the extent of 
international cooperation by the status of a country in joining the Convention on Cybercrimes. 
With dedicated principles related to international co-operation including extradition and mutual 
assistance, the Convention on Cybercrimes may deter attackers who are not constrained by 
physical boundaries. We further include control variables that measure the importance of ICT 
service in the economy and conventional crimes. 
For any pair of countries, their interdependence in cyber attacks is measured by the 
correlation of the residuals during the period of year t that cannot be explained by worldwide 
systematic effects and country-independent effects. Following the literature in independence 
theory where relationships between countries are used to explain the country conflicts (Oneal 
and Russett 1997), we explain the country-to-country interdependence in cyber attacks by 
geographical distance and non-geographical distance. The non-geographical distance refers to 
the relative status between countries from the perspectives that are identified in country-
independent effects. Figure 1 presents our cyber-attack interdependence model. In the next 
section, we discuss the measurements for each factor listed in Figure 1. 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
In the first stage of the regression, the dependent variable is the ratio of the number of 
attacks originating in country i in week w over the total number of attacks from 62 countries, 
denoted by iwr . By using the ratio rather than absolute volume, we want to filter fluctuation in 
cyber attacks resulted from worldwide-systematic effects. 3 Since the 62 countries attacks are not 
the perfect representative of the total attacks all over the world, we would alternatively replace 
the denominator with the average number of attacks from the 62 countries to reduce the sample 
bias.  We regress the ratio of attacks per country per week on the country-specific independent 
variables iwC , year dummy variables, tY  and a set of country dummy variables, iN . By equation 
(1), we derive the residual iweˆ , which captures the country-to-country interdependent effects that 
cannot be explained by the independent variables in the current stage. 
    (1) 
In the second stage, we first calculate the interdependence between any country pair (i,j) in 
year t as the correlation of their residuals within the period, { } { })ˆ,...,ˆ,ˆ,...,ˆ( 11 jsjisiijt eeeecorrr = ,      (2) 
where 1, …, s are the sequence of weeks in year t. Then we regress the interdependence between 
any country pair (i,j) in year t on the geographical distance variables, ijG ,  non-geographical 
                                                 
3 We have used the total volume of attacks originating from country i as our dependent variable, but the nature of 
our results do not change much. However, using the total volume as a dependent variable may result in a more 
serious endogeneity in the model.  
iw t iw i iwr Y C N eα γ= + + + +
Country specific 
effects
Worldwide-
systematic effects
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distance variables, ijtD , and year dummies tY . In particular, we measure the international 
cooperation in enforcement against cybercrimes by two variables: one is the relative status quo in 
joining the Convention as measured by the difference in the number of weeks for each year over 
which the countries have been signed the Convention. The other is the common longitudinal 
status, tW , as measured by the number of weeks since both countries have signed the Convention. 
Since ijG variables do not vary with time, we use a random effect model. The equation for the 
second stage is 
' ' 'ij ij ij ijt t t t tr G D W Yα β γ ε= + + + + + .     (3) 
3. Data 
The SANS Institute established the Internet Storm Center (ISC) in 2001 to assist Internet 
Service Providers and end-users to defend against malicious attacks through the Internet.  The 
ISC follows the data collection, analysis, and warning system used in weather forecasting.  The 
ISC draws samples from many diverse locations to provide an accurate representation of Internet 
activity.  This information is compiled in the DShield database. The limitation of ISC statistics is 
that they only identify the originating country of the attacking packets by IP address, even 
though the originating computers may be under the remote control of attackers located in other 
countries. This is not a critical problem in our study because our model just takes into account 
the number of attacks as a result of the interdependence between countries. 
Our ISC country-level reports include the daily number of attacks for more than 200 
countries from January 2003 onward. 4  We cut off our data collection on December 31, 2007.  
The sample period comprised 60 months or about 1826 days.  However, for unknown reasons, 
ISC did not report attacks for some periods. Thus, the actual number of observations was only 
between 1,050 and 1,402 days per country. The sample comprised 62 countries with the number 
of internet users over 500,000. To avoid the bias caused by time difference among countries, we 
aggregate the data at weekly basis. 
Table 1 lists the measurements for each factor presented in Figure 1. In particular, 
CONSIGNiw equals to 1 if country i signed the Convention in week w, otherwise 0. To measure 
the status in annual basis, we summed up the value of CONSIGNiw within each year. The higher 
the sum, the earlier the country joined the Convention. Therefore, the relative status for any pair 
of countries in year t is measured by the difference of iw
t
CONSIGN∑ .  
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
Table 2 shows the status and date for each country who have signed the Convention on 
Cybercrimes. Table 3 provides the descriptive statistics of the dependent and independent 
variables.  
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
4. Empirical Results 
Referring to Figure 1, equations (1) and (3), we empirically address our research questions 
through two-stage regressions. In the first stage, we work on equation (1) and regress the ratio of 
the number of weekly attacks on worldwide systematic effects and country-specific independent 
effects. The purpose is to assess the deterrent impact of joining the Convention on Cybercrimes 
                                                 
4 The country-level number of reports published by ISC was defined as the average number of packets 
reported from each IP address in the respective country. 
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and further derive the residuals for the next step analysis of the interdependence. Table 4 reports 
the correlation of the independent variables.  
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
As a baseline, we conduct a fixed-effects regression without any adjustment on the 
standard errors. The residuals are used in stage 2 to calculate the yearly-based country-pairwise 
interdependence while the explanation of the coefficients is subject to autocorrelation and 
heteroskedasticity tests. The panel data exhibits high serial correlation, significant 
heteroskedasticity (χ2 = 36549) and cross-sectional interdependence (Pesaran's test = 28.6). Thus 
we employ linear regression with panel-corrected standard errors that assumes panel-specific 
AR1 (First-order Autoregession) autocorrelation structure and cross-sectional heteroskedasticity 
and interdependence (Freeman 1999, Donald & Lang 2007). The results are reported in Table 5, 
column (a). As expected, the coefficient of GDP per capita is positive and significant. Since the 
number of hosts reporting to ISC is proportional to a country’s Internet scale, the Internet access 
variable is supposed to adjust the possible sample bias. Its coefficient, however, is negative and 
significant, which suggests that larger Internet user base was not necessarily associated with 
more source of attacks. Most interestingly, the coefficient of the extent of international 
cooperation as measured by the status of joining the Convention is negative and significant5. 
With 95% confidence interval, signing the Convention was associated with 16.03% ~24.77% 
decrease in the number of attacks originating from the country. Considering that the impact of 
domestic enforcement was very limited (Png et al. 2008), this result shows that international 
cooperation in enforcement did effectively deter cyber attacks.  
For control variables, the ratio of computer, communication and other service over 
commercial service imports has negative and significant coefficient. We then replace it with the 
other two variables, the ratio of the same types of service over commercial service exports or the 
ratio over the total commercial service (incl. imports and exports). The three variables are highly 
correlated, their coefficients are consistently negative and significant and the coefficients of 
other variables do not change much. Referring to the definition in WDI (see footnote 5), the ratio 
of computer, communication and other service over commercial service may be considered as a 
measurement for the scale of ICT service in economy. This estimation result suggests that 
countries with larger scale of ICT service in its economy were less likely to be the source of 
cyber attacks.  
Another control variable, the number of offences per 100,000 inhabitants, has negative 
and significant coefficient. As shown in Table 3, this variable has high and positive correlation 
with GDP per capita and the indicator of international cooperation in enforcement. Thus the 
offence level is not an indicator of poverty but a combined result from economy, culture and 
history. To the best of our knowledge, there has been no study about the possible correlation 
between cybercrimes and conventional crimes. This finding at least shows that high conventional 
crime rate was not necessarily associated with high volume of cyber attacks. 
INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
 To check the robustness of our results, we include more variables to control for other 
possible country-specific independent effects (e.g., Internet monthly subscription price, the 
number of Internet secure servers located in the country, and the unemployment rate with tertiary 
education). However, the data on these variables are missing for some countries (e.g., China, the 
United States, etc). Thus we have only half of the total observations. Table 5, column (b) reports 
                                                 
5 The coefficients of the indicators for ratification or entry-into-force of the convention are not significant due to the 
highly correlation between them and smaller number of observations. 
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the results. The coefficient of the indicator in joining the Convention is still negative and 
significant and provides even more negative confidence interval, (-33.00% ~ -22.60%). The 
coefficients of the three additional variables have the expected signs. Particularly, the 
unemployment rate with tertiary education is positively associated with the number of cyber 
attacks originating from the country. While previous study using general unemployment rate 
cannot find significantly positive impact of unemployment on cyber attacks (Png et al. 2008), 
here we show that unemployment rate for tertiary education may be a more accurate measure of 
the potential workforce for cyber attacks. 
We further conduct a two-way fixed effects regression by incorporating both country-
fixed and weekly-fixed effects. The result is reported in Table 5, column (c). The coefficient of 
the indicator in joining the Convention is similar to the result in column (a), suggesting that 
signing the Convention was associated with 11.38% ~25.22% decrease in the number of attacks 
originating from the country. 
To reduce the possible sample bias as discussed in Section 2, we replace the dependent 
variable with the ratio over the average weekly attacks and repeat the regressions in columns (a) 
and (b). As shown in Table 5, columns (d) and (e), the estimated coefficients and their 
significance level are very similar to that in columns (a) and (b).     
In summary, the first stage estimation and its robustness check show that signing the 
Convention on Cybercrimes was associated with 15.81% ~ 24.77% decrease in the number of 
attacks originating from the country. 
Based on the first stage results, in the second stage, we further examine the impact of the 
Convention on the interdependence of cyber attacks between countries. Referring to equation (2), 
we calculate the country-pairwise correlation per country pair per year to measure the 
interdependence between countries. This generats another panel data with 7725 observations. 
Among them, 4649 pairs have positive correlation. Table 6 reports the correlation of the 
independent variables.  
INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE 
To address the impact of joining the Convention on the interdependence between 
countries, we must answer two questions. First, for any pair of countries, was the closer status in 
joining the Convention associated with higher correlation in the trend of cyber attacks? Second, 
for countries that joined the Convention earlier, did they have higher correlation in the trend of 
cyber attacks? Referring to equation (3), we regress on the whole samples and exclude the year 
fixed effects via a random effect model with adjustment of standard errors. Table 7, column (a) 
reports the result.  
INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE 
Overall, the estimation result provides strong evidences of the interdependence between 
countries in the trend of cyber attacks and that interdependence positively increased in similarity. 
The coefficients of physical distance, the distance in GDP per capita, and Internet access are 
negative and significant. The coefficient of the relative status in joining the Convention by 
signature is also negative and significant, indicating that countries with closer status in joining 
the convention had higher correlation in time series of cyber attacks.  
More interestingly, the coefficient of the common longitudinal status in joining the 
Convention is negative and significant. It suggests that countries that have both joined earlier, 
compared to those that have not yet joined or joined later, had lower correlation. This is intuitive 
considering attackers are strategic and profit-maximizing (Png and Wang 2009). To avoid 
prosecution, they may reduce malicious activities in countries that have strengthened 
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international cooperation in enforcement against cybercrimes. Therefore, cyber attacks 
originating from those countries are less likely organized by international attackers who 
systematically launch attacks originating from a few countries. Hence we may expect that since 
they joined the Convention, the attacks originating from those countries became less correlated 
with each other and with countries that have not yet joined the Convention. 
To check the robustness of the above results and clarify its implications, we further 
conduct the following regressions. First, we include year-fixed effects as they may be highly 
correlated with the common longitudinal status in joining the Convention. Table 7, column (b) 
reports the result. Including year-fixed effects improves the R-square but does not change much 
the coefficients of other variables. 
Next, the finding in column (a) may be driven by those pairs of countries of which 
neither have yet joined the Convention, but their relative status is zero. We exclude those pairs of 
countries and repeated the regression as in column (b). As reported in Table 7, column (c), the 
result is very similar to that in column (b). It confirms that closer status in joining the convention 
were associated with higher correlation in time series of cyber attacks 
One interesting implication from the negative effect of the relative status within panels is 
that if a country joined the Convention, it would become less correlated with those that have not 
yet joined. We test this hypothesis by including only pairs of countries of which one country 
joined the Convention during our studied period while the other has not yet joined. In this case, 
the value of the common longitudinal status in joining the Convention is zero and is excluded 
from the regression. Table 7, column (d) reports the result. The coefficient of the relative status 
in joining the Convention is negative and significant. This result shows that as one country 
joined the Convention, its relative status with those who have not yet joined increased, and the 
correlation between them decreased. 
Another interesting implication from the negative effect of the common longitudinal 
status across panels is that for any pair of countries that have completely the same timing in 
joining or not joining the Convention, those that have joined were less correlated than those that 
have not yet joined. We test this hypothesis by including only pairs whose relative status in 
joining the Convention was always zero during our studied period. In this case, the relative status 
in joining the Convention is excluded from the regression. The result is reported in Table 7, 
column (e). Again, the coefficients of all variables are very similar to previous regressions. The 
coefficient of the common longitudinal status is negative and significant, which confirms our 
speculation. Further, this regression also evidences the negative effect of the common 
longitudinal status within panels, i.e., the correlation between countries that have joined the 
Convention decreased over time.  
Lastly, we notice that among 7725 observations, 4649 pairs have positive correlation 
while the others are negatively correlated. Therefore, if the more distant the relative status in 
joining the Convention was associated with less correlation between countries, did it lead to 
higher probability in negative correlation? We test this speculation via a multinomial logistic 
regression on the subsamples for column (d). Based on the distribution of the correlation 
between countries, we code it into a categorical variable CAT with three categories, i.e. 
correlation between -0.1 and 0.1 is coded as 0; correlation larger than 0.1 is coded as 1; 
correlation less than -0.1 is coded as 2. The distribution of the three categories is 24.21%, 
47.97% and 27.82% respectively. Using the category 1 as the base case, the estimation result 
shows that one week change in the relative status in joining the Convention, the log of the ratio 
of the two probabilities, P(CAT=2)/P(CAT=1), would be increased by 0.0139 with significance 
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level larger than 99%. This result suggests that if one country that have joined the Convention, 
its correlation with those that have not yet joined, became less or even significantly negative. 
The possible explanation is that to avoid prosecution, attackers may strategically relocate the 
source of attacks from the group of countries that have joined the Convention to those that have 
not yet. Consequently the number of attacks from the two groups moved in opposite direction. 
In summary, the estimates for stage 2 suggest that joining the Convention had two types 
of effects on the interdependence between countries in time series of cyber attacks. First, for any 
pair of country, closer status in joining or not joining the Convention was associated with less 
negative or more positive correlation. Second, joining the Convention or joining it earlier was 
associated with lower correlation between countries over time. 
5. Concluding Remarks 
This study has several important implications for government policies, cyber insurers and 
business organizations. First of all, international legislation is an effective way to counter cyber 
attacks among member countries. However, joint operations and mutual legal assistance treaties 
across national borders have long been consdered inadequate (Anderson et al. 2008). In the midst 
of hesitation among a few E.U. member countries, our study provides evidence to support 
participation in the Convention on Cybercrimes. sheds light on identifying the potential 
collaborators to reduce cyber attacks originating from other countries. One important source of 
interdependence is the attacks which control remote terminals to conduct additional attacks in the 
target country. In such a case, the interdependence is not a desirable feature and needs to be 
avoided. For cyber insurers, the country-level interdependence can be used as a framework to 
better assess the risks faced by multinational companies. Based on our results, the overall 
network security risks may be higher for a company operating in two neighboring countries than 
the other companies operating in two geographically dispersed locations. For organizations, this 
study provides the guidance on choosing server locations. For example, it will be more secure to 
locate backup servers in the country with lower interdependence.  
 Our study would have some interesting extensions. We can examine the effects of the 
convention on non-member countries. For instance, the convention may have a displacement 
effect (Png et al. 2008) such that the convention increases the attacks originating from non-
member countries. Second, the nature of attacks and interdependence may be different across 
different communication ports. For instance, “the Well Known Ports are assigned by the IANA 
(Internet Assigned Numbers Authority) and on most systems can only be used by system (or root) 
processes or by programs executed by privileged users” while “the Registered Ports are listed by 
the IANA and on most systems can be used by ordinary user processes or programs executed by 
ordinary users.”  
Like many other studies, our study is not without limitations. First, we are unable to 
collect the data on the number of attacks between two countries. If we had such data, we could 
have directly measured the amount of interdependent attacks between a country pair. Next, some 
country-specific variables are available only at the yearly level while the attacks are measured at 
the weekly level in the first stage. Despite the limitations, our study is one of the first attempts to 
examine the effectiveness of international conventions in deterring cyber attacks and the country-
level interdependence.  
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Appendix 
 
Figure 1. Cyber attack interdependence model 
 
Table 1. Independent variables and their measurement. 
Factors as 
independent 
variables 
Measurements 
GDP per capita, GDPiw. Economy level  Unemployment with tertiary education, UMPiw. 
Internet user base, IUSERi. Internet access  Price basket for Internet monthly subscription, IPRICEiw. 
Scale of ICT service 
in economy 
Computer, communications and other services (% of commercial service imports)6, IMPiw 
Computer, communications and other services (% of commercial service exports), EXPiw 
Computer, communications and other services (% of commercial service imports and 
exports), IMPEXPiw 
                                                 
6 Computer, communications and other services (% of commercial service imports) include such activities as international telecommunications, 
and postal and courier services; computer data; news-related service transactions between residents and nonresidents; construction services; 
royalties and license fees; miscellaneous business, professional, and technical services; and personal, cultural, and recreational services (Source: 
World Development Indicators Database). 
Cyber 
attacks it 
Worldwide-
systematic 
risk 
Country-
specific risk 
Country-
independent risk
Country-to-
Country 
interdependence
Economy level 
Internet access 
Offence rate 
Scale of ICT service in 
economy 
Indicator of joining the 
Convention
Economy distance 
Distance in Internet access 
Distance in offence rate 
Distance in scale of ICT 
service in economy 
Distance in status of 
joining the Convention 
Geographic distance 
Stage 1 
Stage 2 
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Indicator of joining 
the Convention Status in joining the Convention: signature (=1), CONSIGNiw. 
Offence rate The number of offences per 100,000 inhabitants, OFSiw. 
Maximum(GDPiw /GDPjw, GDPjw /GDPiw), the value is constant within a year. Economy distance  Maximum(UMPiw /UMPjw, UMPjw /UMPiw) , the value is constant within a year. 
Maximum(IUSERiw /IUSERjw, IUSERjw /IUSERiw) , the value is constant within a year. Distance in Internet 
access Maximum(IPRICEiw /IPRICEjw, IPRICEjw /IPRICEiw) , the value is constant within a year. 
Distance in scale of 
ICT services in 
economy 
Maximum(IMPiw /IMPjw, IMPjw /IMPiw) , the value is constant within a year, same for EXPiw 
and IMPEXPiw. 
Distance in status of 
joining the 
Convention 
Absolute value (ΣCONSIGNiw- ΣCONSIGNjw), ΣCONSIGNiw is the aggregation within one 
year. 
Common 
longitudinal status in 
International 
cooperation in 
enforcement against 
cybercrimes 
No. of weeks as of year t since both countries have joined the Convention 
Distance in offence 
rate Maximum(OFSiw /OFSjw, OFSjw /OFSiw) , the value is constant within a year. 
Distance in kilometers, time-constant value. Geographic distance Indicator of neighboring country, time-constant value. 
 
Table 2. Status of countries that have joined the Convention on Cybercrimes.7 
States Signature 
Albania 2001-11-23 
Armenia 2001-11-23 
Austria 2001-11-23 
Azerbaijan 2008-6-30 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 2005-2-9 
Belgium 2001-11-23 
Bulgaria 2001-11-23 
Canada 2001-11-23 
Switzerland 2001-11-23 
Montenegro 2005-4-7 
Serbia 2005-4-7 
Cyprus 2001-11-23 
Czech Republic 2005-2-9 
Germany 2001-11-23 
Denmark 2003-4-22 
Estonia 2001-11-23 
Spain 2001-11-23 
Finland 2001-11-23 
France 2001-11-23 
                                                 
7 Source: http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=185&CM=8&DF=&CL=ENG.  
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United Kingdom 2001-11-23 
Georgia 2008-4-1 
Greece 2001-11-23 
Croatia 2001-11-23 
Hungary 2001-11-23 
Ireland 2002-2-28 
Iceland 2001-11-30 
Italy 2001-11-23 
Japan 2001-11-23 
Liechtenstein 2008-11-17 
Lithuania 2003-6-23 
Luxembourg 2003-1-28 
Latvia 2004-5-5 
Moldova 2001-11-23 
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 2001-11-23 
Malta 2002-1-17 
Netherlands 2001-11-23 
Norway 2001-11-23 
Poland 2001-11-23 
Portugal 2001-11-23 
Romania 2001-11-23 
Sweden 2001-11-23 
Slovenia 2002-7-24 
Slovakia 2005-2-4 
Ukraine 2001-11-23 
United States 2001-11-23 
South Africa 2001-11-23 
 
Table 3. Descriptive statistics 
Variable Unit Source Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
attacks in week t for 
country i ─ 
Internet 
storm centre 2103702 7468585 9 115000000 
GDP per capita 
 USD 
Thousands at 
PPP 
GMID 18.56 12.42 1.75 53.08 
Internet access Thousands GMID 14711.22 30866.12 500 216622.5 
Secure Internet 
servers 
per 1 million 
people WDI 117.08 190.67 0.14 1060.39 
Price basket for 
Internet US$ per month WDI 20.58 10.75 1.81 63.21 
Convention on 
security ‘1’as signature 
Council of 
Europe 0.48 0.5 0 1 
Computer, 
communications and 
other services over 
commercial service 
imports 
(% of 
commercial 
service imports 
WDI 34.33 12.9 0.75 73 
Offences per 100,000 inhabitants GMID 3511.04 3209.43 67.9 13997 
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Unemployment with 
tertiary education 
% of total 
unemployment WDI 18.67 12.58 0.2 72.8 
 
Table 4.  Correlations of independent variables in stage 1. 
 GDP per capita 
Internet 
access 
Indicator of 
joining the 
Convention
Computer, communications 
and other services over 
commercial service imports
GDP per capita 1    
Internet access 0.0642 1   
Indicator of joining the 
Convention 0.5458 0.0906 1  
Computer, communications and 
other services over commercial 
service imports 
0.1278 0.2153 0.292 1 
Offence rate 0.698 -0.0496 0.5811 0.2512 
 
 
Table 5. Systemic interdependence and country-specific effects (both dependent variable 
and independent variables are in natural logarithm forms except the indicator of the 
Convention on Cybercrimes)  
Dependent variable: ratio over the total weekly 
attacks 
Dependent variable: ratio over the 
average weekly attacks 
Independent 
variables 
(a) 
OLS: panel-
corrected 
standard error 
(b) 
OLS: panel-
corrected 
standard error 
& Robust 
check 
(c) 
Two-way fixed 
effects 
(d) 
OLS: panel-
corrected 
standard error 
(e) 
OLS: panel-
corrected 
standard error 
& Robust 
check 
GDP per capita 3.26012*** (0.23407) 
1.94850*** 
(0.53124) 
3.30877*** 
(0.24777) 
3.2333*** 
(0.2341) 
1.9543*** 
(0.5316) 
Internet access -0.17192** (0.07122) 
-0.05363 
(0.10756) 
-0.15048*** 
(0.05665) 
-0.1747** 
(0.0712) 
-0.0538 
(0.1076) 
Ratio of internet 
security servers ─ 
-0.16361 
(0.13563) ─ ─ 
-0.1648 
(0.1357) 
Internet price ─ -0.13385*** (0.03868) ─ ─ 
-0.1326*** 
(0.0387) 
Indicator of joining 
the Convention 
-0.22705*** 
(0.05500) 
-0.32295*** 
(0.07211) 
-0.19907** 
(0.08486) 
-0.2242*** 
(0.0550) 
-0.3215*** 
(0.0722) 
Ratio of computer, 
communications 
and other services 
over commercial 
service imports 
-0.46337*** 
(0.06726) 
-0.30853*** 
(0.08951) 
-0.46247*** 
(0.07189) 
-0.4638*** 
(0.0673) 
-0.3091*** 
(0.0895) 
Offence rate -1.63491*** (0.13455) 
-1.94766*** 
(0.39016) 
-1.63712*** 
(0.13774) 
-1.6216*** 
(0.1348) 
-1.9470*** 
(0.3907) 
Unemployed with 
territory education ─ 
0.96297*** 
(0.11578) ─ ─ 
0.9653*** 
(0.1159) 
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year 2004 -0.02687 (0.02971) 
0.17004** 
(0.07385) ─ 
-0.0184 
(0.0298) 
0.1749** 
(0.0740) 
year 2005 -0.04334 (0.03513) 
0.17436* 
(0.10545) ─ 
-0.0258 
(0.0352) 
0.1876* 
(0.1057) 
year 2006 -0.24073*** (0.04521) 
0.18427 
(0.17874) ─ 
-0.2207*** 
(0.0453) 
0.1955 
(0.1790) 
year 2007 -0.26730*** (0.05800) 
0.00000 
(0.00000) ─ 
-0.2507*** 
(0.0581) 
0.0000 
(0.0000) 
Constant 0.00000 (0.00000) 
7.67413* 
(4.37496) 
6.52878*** 
(1.02868) 
0.0000 
(0.0000) 
11.9081*** 
(4.3830) 
R-squared 0.820 0.840 0.823 0.820 0.840 
Convention impact1 -24.77% ~ -16.03% 
-33.00% 
~ -22.60% 
-25.22% 
~ -11.38% 
-24.59% 
~ -15.81% 
-32.92% 
~ -22.48% 
Number of countries 62 55 62 62 55 
Observations 11870 5845 11870 11870 5845 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note:  
1. Impact of the Convention on Cybercrimes was calculated using Kennedy (1981, equation 1.4) and the 
standard error using Garderen and Shah (2002, equation 2.4). 
 
Table 6.  Correlations of independent variables in stage 2. 
 
Distance in 
GDP per cap 
Distance in 
internet 
access 
Relative 
status in 
joining the 
Convention 
Common 
longitudinal status 
in joining the 
Convention 
Distance in the 
ratio of computer, 
communications 
and other services 
import 
Distance in 
offences per 
100,000 
inhabitants 
Physical 
distance
Distance in internet access 0.0457 1      
Relative status in joining the 
Convention 0.1996 0.016 1     
Common longitudinal status 
in joining the Convention -0.1312 0.0093 -0.3546 1    
Distance in the ratio of 
computer, communications 
and other services import 
0.0185 0.0743 0.0119 -0.059 1   
Distance in offences per 
100,000 inhabitants 0.4008 -0.0413 0.1606 -0.1052 -0.0162 1  
Physical distance 0.0393 0.1057 0.1404 -0.262 -0.0454 0.0891 1 
Neighboring country -0.1063 -0.0364 -0.1277 0.0848 -0.0145 -0.063 -0.2633
 
Table 7. Country-specific interdependence (Dependent variable: the correlation of 
residuals by country and year from stage 1)1 
Independent variables 
(a) 
Whole samples 
(b) 
Whole samples 
(c) 
Excluding pairs of 
countries neither of 
which have yet 
joined the 
Convention 
(d) 
Including only 
pairs of country in 
which one joined 
but the other not 
yet 
(e) 
Including only 
pairs that have 
completely the 
same status in 
joining the 
Convention 
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Distance in GDP per cap -0.00347535*** (0.00115542) 
-0.00415788*** 
(0.00115789) 
-0.00551884*** 
(0.00143342) 
-0.00519412*** 
(0.00150427) 
-0.00136174 
(0.00199326) 
Distance in Internet access -0.00027528*** (0.00009972) 
-0.00028435*** 
(0.00010027) 
-0.00026329** 
(0.00010755) 
-0.00015179 
(0.00011212) 
-0.00035809** 
(0.00016745) 
Relative status in joining 
the Convention 
-0.00090154*** 
(0.00014182) 
-0.00087330*** 
(0.00014022) 
-0.00085766*** 
(0.00021352) 
-0.00085969* 
(0.00044829) ─ 
Common longitudinal 
status in joining the 
Convention 
-0.00024956*** 
(0.00008266) 
-0.00022660*** 
(0.00008164) 
-0.00026257*** 
(0.00009081) ─ 
-0.00022405*** 
(0.00008658) 
Distance in the ratio of IT 
service import 
-0.00057223 
(0.00044976) 
-0.00048894 
(0.00045761) 
-0.00057864 
(0.00051036) 
-0.00061144 
(0.00051653) 
-0.00058888 
(0.00082583) 
Distance in offences -0.00027603 (0.00026880) 
-0.00023424 
(0.00027309) 
-0.00020076 
(0.00032043) 
-0.00027586 
(0.00032704) 
-0.00016649 
(0.00045222) 
Physical distance -0.00001076*** (0.00000116) 
-0.00001050*** 
(0.00000115) 
-0.00001171*** 
(0.00000148) 
-0.00000803*** 
(0.00000181) 
-0.00001165*** 
(0.00000171) 
Neighboring country 0.02203826 (0.01902016) 
0.02337230 
(0.01878447) 
0.00722394 
(0.02207645) 
-0.01194192 
(0.03710020) 
0.02903158 
(0.02465120) 
Year 2004 ─ 0.10041813*** (0.01067932) 
0.12687656*** 
(0.01240109) 
0.13822572*** 
(0.01539986) 
0.05984832*** 
(0.01660718) 
Year 2005 ─ -0.06294175*** (0.00979046) 
-0.04308761*** 
(0.01095072) 
-0.02707223** 
(0.01373626) 
-0.10364107*** 
(0.01577035) 
Year 2006 ─ -0.04127503*** (0.00877351) 
-0.02728220*** 
(0.00975762) 
-0.01259651 
(0.01230144) 
-0.07245914*** 
(0.01438531) 
Year 2007 ─ -0.06559872*** (0.01154470) 
-0.06649162*** 
(0.01291353) 
-0.14485471*** 
(0.01564099) 
0.01437430 
(0.01700941) 
Constant 0.17716007*** (0.00946612) 
0.18260768*** 
(0.01076698) 
0.18003837*** 
(0.01223954) 
0.15630075*** 
(0.02454114) 
0.19994724*** 
(0.01634173) 
Observations 7725 7725 5729 3922 3386 
Number of panels 1830 1830 1365 930 765 
R-square1 0.0235 0.0656 0.0569 0.0400 0.0277 
Robust standard errors in parentheses ; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note:  
1. R-square is the normal OLS R-square. 
